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Abstract 
The U.S. Army is currently working on the development of a new hybrid type of 
infantryman. Land Warrior is the name for the project which aims at equipping the 
dismounted soldiers with wearable computers, head-up display, permanent online 
connection and other technical components. The idea is to link up the dismounted 
soldier to an information and communications network spanning the whole field 
of operation. This project sets the stage for the introduction of a completely new 
type of soldier. It aims not merely at securing a new armament technology, but the 
complete technical and disciplinary reconfiguration of the soldier. The project 
transfers to the micro-level of the soldier the whole set of expectations which the 
military command units and advisers have in mind as a consequence of the ep-
ochal changeover to the "Information Age". The change introduced by information 
technology, so the argument goes, brings with it new kinds of opponents and dan-
gers, but also new opportunities for military strategy. It transforms the entire fabric 
of geo-political and armament technology. Thus it brings the need for a change of 
the rationality of organisation of the military: founded on the plan of a "Network-
centric warfare", there is to be a programmatic re-structuring which extends right 
from the ideas of warfare to the design of the individual soldier. The combination 
of two research perspectives is used as a heuristical guideline for the empirical 
presentation. Fundamental assumptions of actor-network theory, and the idea that 
technical expectations can be seen as far-reaching "prospective structures", lead 
the gaze to the decisive significance of the main expectation, that of standing at 
the threshold of the information age. And they bring into sharper focus the idea of 
network-centric warfare as a programmatic analysis, which translates the technical 
developments into social demands made on organisational structures, procedures 
and cultures; and which, conversely, interprets the military definitions of situation, 
strategic and tactical, as a technological challenge. Drawing on Foucault’s analysis 
of forms of governance and its further extension within governmentality studies, 
this not only allows a systematic treatment of the reconfiguration of the soldier 
which this process of change entails, it also shows how thorough-going and far-
reaching are the transformations of the soldier-subject which are envisioned. And 
the recourse to the Foucauldian perspective at the same time shows us how a net-
work-type coordination of action, encouraging decentrality and self-organisation, 
implicitly requires for its precondition a specific kind of subjectivity structured by 
processes of power. 
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1 Introduction: the Thesis of "The 
Postmodern Military"1 
Land Warrior is the term given to the 
project of reconfiguring the soldier in a 
socio-technical sense by equipping 
him with wearable computers, head-up 
display, permanent online connection, 
and other components. Land Warrior 
is not merely a technical innovation 
along the usual lines of development 
in armament technology. It is much 
rather the innovation of a new type of 
soldier. A soldier-type whose forma-
tion can be seen as both a promise and 
a requirement, an effect and the basis, 
of a new military order: "Today, we are 
on the threshold of a new era, and we 
must proceed into it decisively. Today 
the Industrial Age is superseded by the 
Information Age, the Third Wave, hard 
on the heels of the agrarian and indus-
trial eras. Our present Army is well-
configured to fight and win in the late 
Industrial Age, and we can handle 
Agrarian-Age foes as well. We have 
begun to move into Third Wave War-
fare, to evolve a new force for a new 
century – Force XXI […] Force XXI will 
represent a new way of thinking for a 
new wave of warfare." (Office of Chief 
of Staff of the U.S. Army, 1994; quoted 
in Der Derian 2001: 16-17). 
This quote reflects a far-reaching con-
viction of the military strategic think-
ing of today. The US army leaders are 
taking the "Information Age" as the 
starting point for their situation report. 
Information is determining the forms 
of production and civilisation. The 
information age is producing new op-
ponents, and at the same time it is 
determining the direction for one’s 
                                                       
1 This study was made possible by a re-
search grant from the Deutsche For-
schungsgemeinschaft. I would like to ex-
press my thanks to Prof. Dr. Gerhard 
Tröster, of the Electronics Institute at the 
Zurich ETH, and Mr. Riccardo Sibilia, of the 
Zentrum für Wissenschaft und Technologie 
of Armasuisse, for providing information 
about the technical components of Wear-
able Computing and the Land Warrior Pro-
ject. 
own "evolution". This diagnosis of hav-
ing arrived at the threshold of an ep-
och, with the new threat situation, and 
the state of one’s own forces – all 
these are now to be thought of as 
grouped together, as one unit – such is 
the pivotal concept for the military 
situation report. The horizon of expec-
tations, from this sense of standing at 
the threshold of the information age, is 
here translated into a programme of 
restructuring the military apparatus, 
and this finds expression at the micro-
level as the reconfiguration of the sol-
dier. Land Warrior is the dismounted 
soldier who set up for action in the 
setting of this new age. 
Considering the case of Land Warrior, 
one finds a great significance in the 
general observation of the actor-
network theory that the development 
of technology – be it the individual 
artifacts or entire technologies – al-
ways entails the design of a complete 
"setting", the design of "assemblies of 
human and non-human actants where 
the competences and performances 
are distributed" (Akrich/Latour 1992: 
259). In such "settings" – in French 
dispositifs (ibid) – the roles of humans 
and non-humans are distributed, role 
expectations are formulated, moral 
norms are translated into technical 
functions and technical regulations, 
possible courses of action are shut off 
or opened up. In the Land Warrior 
project, these translations and attribu-
tions are linked to the idea of the dis-
positive, known from the tradition of 
Foucault theory. Foucault applied the 
term "Dispositives of power" (1978) to 
describe the lines of force, rationalities 
of governance, the practical knowl-
edge, procedures and installations, 
which have been directed to the fash-
ioning of specific subjects since the 
18th century.2 And this shows us the 
                                                       
2 Like other theorists who are interested in 
the long-term structural changes of sub-
ject-formation, and who especially look at 
the transition from traditional to modern 
societies, Foucault saw in the military one 
of the central institutions in which the 
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right context for understanding the 
human-to-machine integration which 
the Land Warrior project is aiming at. 
Here it is not merely a case of "pre-
scription, proscription, affordances, 
allowances" (Akrich/Latour 1992: 261), 
for example when one wishes to inte-
grate such items as cat-flaps, street 
kerbing, key-rings, safety belts, and 
door-closers into the human activities 
in programmes of action (Latour 1992, 
1996: 15-83). As will be shown here, 
Land Warrior instead aims at some-
thing of quite a different order, a com-
prehensive reconfiguration of technical 
competencies and military disciplining. 
The principle here is that one does not 
just control this or that action, but 
strives to work on the general capaci-
ties and overall arrangement or dispo-
sitions of people and machines. The 
rationality and full range of this recon-
figuration only become clear when one 
sees the possibilities for action which 
Land Warrior opens up, as a part of a 
more comprehensive programme of 
action. And this is: to manage warfare 
in the Information Age. Or to put it 
more precisely: to re-program the mili-
tary so as to make it fit for warfare in 
the Information Age. 
In order to make clear the basic rea-
soning, the calculation of the economy 
of force, which is driving the Land 
Warrior project forward, one has first 
to outline the processes of transforma-
tion affecting the international balance 
of force, within the frame of which the 
reconfiguration of the military and the 
soldiers is taking place. Taking up the 
key idea of a transition to a "postmod-
ern military", which has now become 
so prominent in military sociology, one 
                                                                  
generally valid forms of governance found 
their model expression. Thus Max Weber 
(1976: 686) for example described the mili-
tary as the "womb" of all discipline. And 
Norbert Elias (1976: espec. 263-283) also 
present a treatment of the structural ho-
mology, mirror-imaging and partial identity 
of the different practices, mechanisms, 
technologies and guidelines of civil and 
military social disciplining and subject 
formation. 
finds that there are four lines which 
can be identified, to describe the way 
this change is manifesting.3 
Firstly, the military field of operation is 
governed by the perception of a new 
kind of threat situation. The whole set 
of military thinking and acting is no 
longer primarily focussed on the nu-
clear threat and on a conventional 
opponent. The activities of warfare and 
coercion by non-government agents 
have developed to the point where 
they represent a challenge to the mili-
tary of Western societies. And the brief 
of the military is redefined accordingly. 
It is no longer just a case of warfare 
against conventional opponents. Now 
the opponent can also be a criminal, a 
drug-baron or a terrorist. As a result 
the brief includes numerous opera-
tions of a non-military nature: "peace-
keeping", "humanitarian assistance", 
"counterdrug" or "counterterrorism" 
(cf. CJCS 2000: 7). 
Secondly, there is the influence of a 
general change of culture which can be 
seen in the forming of the armed 
forces. There is thus the need for an 
adjustment to civil social develop-
ments, and a number of cultural com-
monplaces, dominated by masculine 
groupings, are undermined, for exam-
ple when women are integrated in the 
battle-forces. 
Thirdly, there is a new approach to the 
organisational structure which shows 
the armed forces in a new light. The 
thesis of a "postmodern military" iden-
tifies a gradual erosion of hierarchies, 
and the fixed boundaries between 
types of weaponry, and between battle 
                                                       
3 Cf. the volume by Moskos/Williams/Segal 
(2000), which has now become a standard 
reference, in which the U.S. military is in-
troduced as the paradigm of a "post-
modern military" (Moskos 2000), and then 
following this model the individual aspects 
of the change are listed in sequence for 12 
further Western nations. For the interna-
tional reception of the concept cf. also 
Boëne (2003), and for its adoption by Ger-
man military sociology the omnibus vol-
ume by Kümmel/Collmer (2002).  
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and service troops. Thus the military 
programme of a "Network-centric war-
fare" (cf. Cebrowski/Garstka 1998; Al-
berts/Garstka/Stein 1999; Al-
berts/Hayes 2003) is found to relate 
expressly to the revised new context of 
the current type of new enterprise, 
where one works with de-centralised 
organisation, flat hierarchies, modular 
and task-oriented co-operation, virtual 
teamwork, lean production, and pre-
cise logistics. The military network 
concept, in an analogous way, sees the 
possibility of operating with flexible, 
task-specific procedures, and units put 
together in an ad hoc way. The military 
has to view itself, in fact, as a "net-
work-centric enterprise" (Al-
berts/Garstka/Stein 1999: 89). 
Fourthly, the forces of globalisation, 
with the loss of state sovereignties that 
they entail, are having their effect on 
the constitution of armed forces. The 
missions are increasingly carried out 
at the request of international in-
stances, in co-ordination with other 
armed forces, in an arrangement with 
non-state organisations; indeed the 
troops themselves are often made up 
of international, and not always mili-
tary, forces. 
The basic forces guiding the reorgani-
sation of the military can be deter-
mined by a reference to the thesis of 
the postmodern military. However, the 
term "postmodern military" suggests 
an observation of the transformation 
process in the military field made 
within a given, static typology. The 
typology defines observed trends of 
the change as factual elements of a 
new type of organisation, instead of 
analysing the process of its (potential) 
constitution. What is ignored by this 
form of analysis is a fact which imme-
diately springs to mind when one has 
the perspective of discursive analysis: 
the expectations, plans, programmes 
and projects which are formulated, 
drafted and set in motion by the advi-
sors, officer units, programme leaders, 
project developers, – they are all 
clearly bound and tied up to techno-
logical factors. The first point here is 
that right at the outset the military 
views itself as in the midst of a transi-
tion not to the "postmodern", but to 
the "Information Age", and naturally it 
then sets about handling the central 
components of its transformation 
process accordingly, from this starting 
diagnosis.4 
It is this aspect which we will now take 
up as the fifth line of influence: tech-
nology defining the scope of military 
reorganisation and ultimately that of 
the new dismounted soldier. It will be 
presented in three stages in the follow-
ing sections. (2) Firstly one needs to 
clearly establish what it means if the 
expectations for future development 
are centred on information and the 
information age. (3) Following this 
course of approach, we show how the 
expectations are linked to the planned 
idea of a network-centric warfare 
which attempts to combine a techno-
logical transformation with a recon-
figuration of military organisational 
structure and organisational culture. 
(4) Finally the project of the reconfigu-
ration of the soldier will be studied in 
its following aspects: (4.1) technical, 
                                                       
4 As evidence for the thesis that it is the 
expectation of an information age, and not 
the thesis of postmodernism, which does 
in fact guide military thought, one can 
adduce this example of a statistical sam-
pling. A search for key terms which was 
run on the Internet pages of the U.S. mili-
tary and military-related institutions came 
up with the following results, for "Informa-
tion Age" and "Postmodern". The journal 
"Parameters" issued by the U.S. Army War 
College (<http://carlisle-
www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/>) gave 
72 and 28 hits resp.; the webpage of the 
Strategic Studies Institute (<www.strate-
gicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/>) gave 207 
and 10 hits resp.; and that of the Rand-
Corporation (<www.rand.org/>) 200 and 
28 hits respectively. While these webpages 
mainly refer to publications of strategic 
advisors, planners and think-tank experts, 
on the website of the U.S. Army 
(<www.army.mil>) one finds a great vari-
ety of different articles – from official 
guidelines, to troop reports, to military 
news. Here there was a hit count of 9,520 
and 17 resp. (data gathered on 20.12.2005). 
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(4.2) skill-related, (4.3) ethical-
normative and (4.4) that of disciplinary 
space. Unlike in the case we men-
tioned of a typological attribution, here 
by applying the concepts of expecta-
tion, programme and project, empha-
sis will be placed on the dynamic and 
mobilising character of the transfor-
mation. 
 
2 Expectations: the Military in the 
Information Age 
One can say that it is now freely ac-
cepted in (technology-related) sociol-
ogy, that expectations about possible 
future technologies direct and guide 
the actions of social actors, that ar-
rangements are made for certain fu-
ture developments.5 The descriptions 
of the society-structuring factor of 
expectations for future technology, are 
strongly coloured by this idea of "pro-
spective structure" (Lente/Rip 1998). 
"Expectations allocate roles for selves, 
others and (future) artefacts. When 
these roles are adopted, a new social 
order emerges on the basis of collec-
tive projections of the future." (ibid 
203) The idea that expectations about 
technical developments are particu-
larly liable to actually becoming a de-
ciding force of structuration, is sup-
ported by the fact that the talk of an 
inevitable technological progress can 
be considered as a central "ideograph" 
for the modern era, and conversely, 
technical progress can be viewed as 
the classic feature of modernity (Lente 
2000). Since the progress in what is 
technologically feasible appears to be 
an evident fact, the step from the pre-
diction of a development – often com-
ing across as tantamount to a promise 
– to the necessity of it happening, is 
readily made (ibid). The predictions of 
                                                       
5 For the role played by future expectations 
about the development of specific tech-
nologies, in ideals, metaphors, science 
fiction, political agendas, cf. Dierkes/Hoff-
mann/Marz 1992; Mambrey/Pateau/Tepper 
1995; Brown/Rappert/Webster 2000; Kon-
rad 2004; Uerz 2004. 
a future technology generally press for 
action. It is precisely these two factors, 
a strong and effective will to fashion 
structures, and a great keenness to 
describe future expectations as neces-
sary requirements, which one can ob-
serve in the present transformations of 
the military. One can track the way the 
idea of the "Information Age" inspires 
the successive unfolding of socio-
technical structures, on three levels of 
social aggregation: it presents general 
guidelines of armament technology, it 
defines the frame of military organisa-
tional alignment, and also the frame 
for the restructuring of the soldier. 
Now we will deal first with the general 
guidelines of strategic armament. 
The concept of the information age is 
linked to a set of expectations which 
are concerned primarily with the 
macro-societal level, predicting a far-
reaching change in all fields of society. 
The main reference for the military 
experts, the "forethinkers", is the work 
of futurologist Alvin Toffler. "Third 
wave" is the metaphor used by Toffler 
(1980) to describe a third wave of ep-
ochal change, which is to bring a 
change in civilisation comparable to 
that caused by the transition to the 
agrarian economy, and to the indus-
trial revolution. Toffler’s diagnosis is 
translated in the military field as a di-
agnosis identifying a "Revolution in 
Military Affairs", a conceptional stan-
dard which has already been given an 
acronym: RMA (cf. Hundley 1999; 
Sloan 2002; Cohen 2004). This refer-
ence to an epochal transition, the 
mention of a revolution, is used to 
support the radicalness of the change 
demanded in the military field, its ur-
gency and its wide scope. Mobilise and 
get ready for a constant change, so 
runs the military programme. "In to-
day’s world, change has become the 
norm, not the exception", this is how 
Frank Fernandez, director of DARPA 
(Defense Advanced Research Projects 
Agency), describes the state of affairs 
(quoted from Der Derian 2001: 102). 
The rhetoric of looking to the future, of 
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radical and permanent change, be-
comes ubiquitous when one speaks of 
RMA. In 1994 the army refers to it as 
"new force", "new century", a "new way 
of thinking" and "Force XXI". Later on 
one finds such concepts as "Army after 
next" and "Future army", presented as 
guidelines for a change of organisa-
tion. And in 1996 the future-oriented 
programme Joint Vision 2010 is issued, 
addressing all the armed forces; fol-
lowed four years later by Joint Vision 
2020 (cf. CJCS 1996, 2000). 
The talk of RMA suggests some far-
reaching technocratic visions. Regard-
ing armament technology, it lays stress 
on the dynamics of technical develop-
ment, especially information and 
communications technology, which is 
said to do away with the existing base 
of military power. No longer does mili-
tary strike-power result primarily from 
the potency of weapons, but rather 
from a superior co-ordination of in-
formation and communications tech-
nology. The expectation transits seam-
lessly into requirement: "The future is, 
as Toffler says, that unless you tame 
technology, we will encounter future 
shock. We’re not only taming technol-
ogy, we are turning technology into 
not future shock, but future security." 
(defence minister William Cohen 1997, 
quoted from Der Derian 2001: 113) The 
RMA caused by information technol-
ogy is going to come anyway, so the 
logic goes, one just has to keep 
abreast of it, at the forefront of it. It is 
certainly clear that efforts in the field 
of armament are concentrating on 
information technologies under the 
head of "digitization". Two techno-
cratic visions are linked to this: that of 
the "transparent battlespace", and that 
of the "precision strike" (cf. Sloan 
2002: 4-9). Surveillance using satel-
lites, planes and low-flying unmanned 
aircraft will – so the prediction goes – 
make all that can be visible, visible, 
using radar as well as thermal and 
optical imaging. And parallel to this, in 
the field of Command and Control, 
there will be sufficient executive power 
to fight everything that can be ob-
served. Warfare in the "Information 
Age" means that one no longer tries to 
gain military strength by individual, 
superior weapons systems, but rather 
by using information and communica-
tions technology to network them, by 
"intelligent munitions" and new sur-
veillance technologies. Certainly such 
visions are an advantage in the strug-
gle for budgets and funding: informa-
tion technologies hold out the promise 
of delivering more performance at less 
expenditure (Adams 1998: 93-101, 
122-137; Sloan 2002: 46-48).6 
In this way the military use of the term 
Information Age draws on a basic 
principle of the sociological thesis of 
an information society: "By informa-
tion society one evidently means a 
recommendation and a program of 
                                                       
6 At this point it would be appropriate to 
add a note about the current state of the 
literature. Most of the publications on the 
subject of this military transformation 
originate from the military sector itself, and 
the military sociological research, too, is 
almost everywhere (this applies especially 
to the USA) institutionally and financially 
tied to military organisations, and accord-
ingly application-oriented (cf. Caforio/ 
Nuciari 2003). Hence we find that mixtures 
of diagnosis and advice are the rule. The 
present study is based on a comprehensive 
analysis of materials about RMA, especially 
the numerous publications of the "think 
tanks" such as the RAND-Corporation or 
the Command and Control Research Pro-
gramme; further, the leading journals in 
the field of military studies have been sys-
tematically evaluated, and here as a pri-
mary reference one can name Parameters, 
the Quarterly of the US Army War College. 
Regarding the change in training, the pub-
lished studies of the U.S. Army Research 
Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sci-
ences have provided a detailed insight into 
the transformatory processes, while a de-
scription of their broader outlines can also 
be found in the texts of military sociology. 
The present article is based to a large ex-
tent on a kind of reading "against the grain" 
of the central programmatic writings, i.e. 
advisory texts and instructions as well as 
the findings of military sociology literature. 
Such an approach in this context was only 
used by the quoted writings of Der Derian 
(2001) and Dillon (2002). 
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action which one wants to impose 
upon a government." (Stichweh 1998: 
438) It is our perception that this 
thread occurs throughout the entire 
sociological works: from the one per-
formed on behalf of the Japanese gov-
ernment which introduced the term 
into the political debate towards the 
end of the 1960’s, up to the now well-
known study by Simon Nora and Alain 
Minc which was ordered by the French 
government in the year 1980, and fi-
nally up to Al Gore’s programme of 
information-superhighways (cf. ibid: 
434-439; Konrad 2004: 41-49). The 
military prognosis participates in 
widespread visions of how controllable 
and manageable technical and social 
progress will be, and takes up the idea 
of a transition from industrial warfare 
to war in the information age, translat-
ing it into the technocratic vision of a 
transition from mass destruction to 
precision warfare (cf. Adams, 1998: 
292-304; Der Derian 2001: xv-vxii). The 
expectations bound up with the infor-
mation age first structure the military 
apparatus in two ways: they prescribe 
the focus for armament technology, 
and they exert an extremely mobilising 
effect by setting the mood for exten-
sive processes of change. 
 
3 Programme of Action: the Net-
work as Prospective Structure 
Finally, the idea of a network-centric 
warfare leads from a general mobilisa-
tion to the actual, concrete programme 
of transformation. The concept was 
introduced into the debate on RMA by 
vice-admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski with 
his co-author John J. Garstka, in 1998, 
and rose to become the programmatic 
guideline for the restructuring of the 
American armed forces. As the "father 
of network-centric warfare" (DoD 
2001), Cebrowski was eventually ap-
pointed director of the Office of Force 
Transformation, which was formed in 
November 2001 with the task of co-
ordinating and promoting the struc-
tural change of the armed forces. 
The entire programme of network-
centric warfare aims at a comprehen-
sive transformation: "Initiating a 
whole-scale re-thinking of the very 
basis of military organization, doc-
trine, force requirements, procurement 
policies, training and operational con-
cepts." (Dillon 2002: 73) The idea de-
rives its effective energy and plausibil-
ity from a variety of heterogeneous 
sources. The factors and procedures of 
structuring the organisation, are 
geared to the new organisational ra-
tionality governing enterprises in the 
economic field, as we have indicated 
earlier. And the idea gains further 
plausibility from the reference to the 
type of organisation of the new oppo-
nents, who are after all themselves, 
too, operating in the networked rather 
than the hierarchical style (Ar-
quilla/Ronfeldt 2001). Furthermore, it 
draws its powers of persuasion from 
considerations of complexity theory, 
which draw parallels between natural 
events as interpreted by chaos theory 
and the nature of warfare, and explain-
ing the societal concept of self-
organisation as a strategy for manag-
ing complexity (Alberts/Czerwinski 
1997; Czerwinski 1998). Finally – and 
this is the point which is to be outlined 
in what follows – the concept of net-
work-centric warfare draws its ration-
ale from the translation of cultural 
forms which have emerged from the 
development of the Internet, into the 
setting of warfare. 
The immediate reasoning, however, is 
that networking is considered to be the 
key to an increase in military strike-
power. The director of the Command 
and Control Research Program David 
Alberts and his co-authors put it like 
this: "We define NCW as an informa-
tion-superiority-enabled concept of 
operations that generates increased 
combat power by networking sensors, 
decision makers, and shooters to 
achieve shared awareness, increased 
speed of command, higher tempo of 
operations, greater lethality, increased 
survivability, and a degree of self-
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synchronization." (1999: 2) In harmony 
with this idea, as one of the central 
initiatives in this transformation, the 
U.S. Defense Department has been 
working on setting up a Global Infor-
mation Grid (GIG) (Libicki 2000). The 
GIG is considered to be an "Internet-
like network for D[epartment]O[f]D[e-
fense]-related operations" (GAO 2004: 
3), a military Internet in which every-
thing is connected, the entire com-
mand and control systems, all the 
weapons platforms, all the soldiers 
down to the individual footsoldier, 
together with other services, from 
weather to the secret service. A pro-
jected date for the basic installation is 
2020, and 21 mill. $ have been set 
aside for the period to 2010 alone. 
This military Internet is the technical 
means to implement the new organisa-
tional structures, procedures and so-
cial behavioural forms – or to put it 
more precisely: the means to initiate 
the "coevolution of organization, doc-
trine, and technology in the warfight-
ing ecosystem" (Alberts/Garstka/ Stein 
1999: 3). The Internet, or an Internet-
type design of information manage-
ment, is conceived as the catalyst for a 
completely new structuring of social 
roles, an entirely new organisational 
culture. On the basis of the GIG, in-
formation management is to be shifted 
from a "platform-centric" to a "net-
work-centric" design, and operated in 
a way akin to the Internet. And this is a 
trend which is diametrically opposed 
to the present military communica-
tions methods. Martin Libicki (1999: 
23) presents these ideas graphically in 
the following sketch (Fig. 1). 
No longer are we to have the scenario 
where the individual battle groups 
have access to specific means of sur-
veillance, and the gathered informa-
tion is then made mutually available to 
each of them. This is how the conven-
tional form of military information 
management is set up. The new 
method now is to have the sensor data 
entered into a common network, and 
then distributed and made retrievable 
via this network, in collated, proc-
essed, stored and administered form. 
The "networking of sensors, decision-
makers and shooters" thus means do-
ing away with the exclusive power of 
certain specific platforms to hold spe-
cific pieces of information. The flow of 
information is to be decoupled from 
the traditional functional and hierar-
chical differentiation. Hierarchies, mo-
nopolies, the asymmetrical control of 
information, are brought into a kind of 
marketplace allocation. The informa-
tion flow is decoupled from the hierar-
chy of command. The powers of in-
formation management are shifted 
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from the sender to the user. No longer 
do those who provide the information 
decide to whom it is to be given, for 
whom it might be of use. They simply 
enter it into the network. Potential 
users decide what they want to do with 
it (Libicki 1999: 71-93; Alberts/Garst-
ka/Stein 2000: 65-68; Albert/Hayes 
2003: 74-82). This is exactly what is 
meant by "shared awareness": the dis-
tribution of information takes place 
not through "stovepipe monopolies" 
but via the GIG, which consists of 
"eclectic, adaptable marketplaces" (Al-
berts/Hayes 2003: 218). 
Even more far-reaching is the proposal 
to radically change the function of 
command. One heuristic approach to 
successful philosophies of command, 
from the 20th century, lays out a series 
of six steps: passing from a manner of 
proceeding which is regulated in a 
detailed fashion and centrally con-
trolled, to operational forms which are 
decentrally controlled by general rules 
and intentions only (Alberts/Hayes 
2003: 18-26). Equipped with network 
technology, one might expect that one 
could potentially operate using all 
types of procedure. But, say the pro-
tagonists of network-centric warfare, 
the optimum in "speed of command" 
und "tempo of operations" can only be 
attained using the latter type of proce-
dure which we have just mentioned: 
"Self-synchronization is perhaps the 
ultimate in achieving increased tempo 
and responsiveness." (Alberts/Garstka/ 
Stein 1999: 175) Self-synchronisation 
means short-circuiting the feedback-
loops of observation, orientation, deci-
sion, action, which are spread out over 
various functioning units, and hence 
also the traditional chain of command 
itself: even before a command is is-
sued, the subordinate instance has 
grasped the situation and anticipated 
the change needed (cf. Wesen-
stein/Belenky/Balkin 2005: 95-97). The 
central entity to which the actors ori-
ent themselves is no longer the com-
mand, but the picture of the overall 
situation, which is circulating in the 
network. 
Military publications have drawn a lot 
from thinkers of the "cyberpunk cul-
ture" described in Wired Magazine (cf. 
Der Derian 2001: 17-18). Here again it 
is not the technocratic vision of central 
control, central management, which is 
given priority, not the technical engi-
neering metaphor of the network. 
Rather it is biological evolution and 
self-organisation which are seen to 
enable the management of unpredicted 
events by a co-ordination of scattered 
knowledge, by organisation using bot-
tom-up processes (cf. Wyatt 2000: 118-
120). The tendency is for the network 
to overlay the chain of command: 
"Unlocking the full power of the net-
work also involves our ability to affect 
the nature of the decisions that are 
inherently made by the network, or 
made collectively, rather than being 
made by an individual entity." (Al-
berts/Garstka/Stein 1999: 105). Collec-
tivist principles are no longer opposed; 
they are incorporated as a productive 
force. The collective takes centre-
stage, the power of position is re-
placed by the effective powers of relat-
edness. Functions are no longer 
hoarded at command posts, now the 
motto is rather "Power to the Edge". 
(Alberts/Hayes 2003: 180-181) 
Following on from the focus on net-
work structures, other factors of ex-
pectation of the information society 
come into play, beside those with the 
stress on the potential for technocratic 
regulation and control. When the pro-
tagonists of network-centric warfare 
refer to an information society, they 
are evidently inspired by media theory 
and inter-cultural flow, for example 
when they refer in an appreciative way 
to the forms of a "distributed social 
order" (Faßler 2001), and this with a 
view to reconstituting the military itself 
as just such a network organisation.
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4 Land Warrior: The Soldier as 
Socio-Technological Project 
The new rationality of organisation, 
and the new organisational culture 
which is emerging along with it, call 
for a redesigning of the soldiers them-
selves. Within the compass of net-
work-based military operations, new 
models of leadership are developed, 
and the infantryman, the simple dis-
mounted soldier, is also thought of in 
a new way. The defining character of 
what goes to make up a soldier is in a 
process of change. 
This change can be described sche-
matically as having four aspects, with 
reference to a general analysis of 
forms of government, meaning the 
forms of governance and self-
formation (cf. Foucault 1986: 37-39; 
Dean 1999: 20-39). 
Firstly, forms of governance always 
work with specific techniques, with a 
certain kind of expertise and know-
how, together with procedures, in-
struments and strategies, to shape 
specific subjects. From this standpoint, 
the predominant feature which charac-
terises the dismounted soldier is that 
he is conceived as a socio-technical 
venture at the height of the informa-
tion age. Here the techniques of sub-
ject-formation lead to a technical hard 
core. 
Secondly, the techniques of governing 
are always informed by a specific 
knowledge, a specific rationality. They 
refer back to an underlying thought-
structure, which determines what can 
be taken as realisable, what can actu-
ally be done. For the new soldier, it is 
the appeal to the network idea itself 
which is the basis for determining 
what the soldier has to learn, in what 
direction, by what methods he should 
be shaped, by what skills he should be 
distinguished. 
Thirdly, the techniques of administra-
tion present a set of duties, of rules, of 
expectations, by means of which the 
subjects are bound and defined. Sub-
jectivity is based on an ethical dimen-
sion, it is not conceivable without 
some ethical foundation. And in the 
context of the network-based recon-
figuration of the soldier the question 
presents itself with fresh urgency, as to 
what should be the professional cul-
ture, the soldierly ethos, the thing 
which marks the soldier apart from all 
other subjects. 
Fourthly, every form of administration 
contains a telos or aim, which means it 
at once brings into play a kind of uto-
pia or utopian ideal. Governing is 
based on programmatic formulations 
and ideas which work on the assump-
tion that subjects can be fashioned in 
the desired manner. And yet at the 
same time, every programmatic ap-
proach draws its energy from the fact 
that programme and reality do not 
match up completely. We will now take 
a closer look at this telos of govern-
ance, which presents a kind of utopian 
ideal, in order to show the special form 
of disciplinary space which is set up in 
operations following the network 
paradigm. 
4.1 The Soldier as Information-
Technology Venture 
During a conference organised for the 
Pentagon by the Oak Ridge National 
Laboratory in 2001, the purpose of 
which was to formulate proposals for 
the visions and plans outlining the 
development of the soldier of the fu-
ture, General Paul Gorman of the Insti-
tute for Defense Analysis and Science 
Board described the general situation 
of the infantryman as follows: 
"The soldier of today is thrust far for-
ward. He is the point of the Army 
spear. It is very lethal and very lonely 
out there. The soldier of tomorrow will 
never be alone and he will advance on 
his enemy shielded by dominant in-
formation. His leaders will be able to 
say this to him: ‘Soldier, you are the 
master of your battlespace. You will 
shape the fight. The network will en-
able you to see all that can be seen. 
You will out-think, out-maneuver and 
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out-shoot your enemy. The Force is 
with you. You are one with the Force.’" 
(NSD 2001, Composite Vision: 2) 
The mobilisation of the future, the 
playing off of the present against a 
predicted technical development to 
come, characterises the forming of the 
soldier. Gorman’s diagnosis of the 
present situation hints at the fact that 
the dismounted soldier was a ne-
glected figure in the military thought of 
the Cold War. There was no place re-
served for him on the highly modern-
ised battlefield, an area possibly even 
contaminated by tactical atomic weap-
onry. The only form one could still 
imagine the infantry taking was in the 
guise of robots. And it was only the 
new threat scenarios which brought 
the infantry back into view. Generally 
the miscarried operation in Somalia of 
1993 – which as "Black Hawk Down" 
has already been turned into a notori-
ous media event – has been styled as 
the starting-point for considering a 
complete overhauling of the infantry 
(Adams 1998: 60-80, 108-111). 
The ultimate soldier of whom Gorman 
speaks was first presented as the 
"Land-Warrior" in 1994. The "Land-
Warrior" was going to be an integra-
tion of the dismounted soldier into the 
information network covering the en-
tire field of battle, by means of wear-
able computer, permanent radio con-
tact, global positioning system, head-
gear with integrated speaker, micro-
phone and optical display, laser range-
finders, day/night cameras and other 
technical devices. The overall idea of 
network-centric warfare is based on 
the feasibility of technically linking up 
the infantryman to the tactical situa-
tion picture, to keep him permanently 
online. The infantryman should not 
merely be fitted out with new pieces of 
equipment. Rather he is projected as 
an integral unity of man and machine 
(Sterk 1997: 69; Schaprian/Rather 
1997). 
Land Warrior is a project in which 
three general expectations for the re-
search into wearable computers are 
spelled out in military terms (Baumeler 
2005: 10-15). Firstly, what the tradi-
tional soldier could learn of just by a 
kind of vague sensing, will be achieved 
by automated context sensitivity: sen-
sors integrated into the uniform and 
distributed at other locations are to 
recognise surroundings which are con-
taminated chemically, atomically or 
biologically, and trigger automatic 
warnings. And also the vague sensing 
of the opponent, and his concealed or 
nocturnal movements, is to be re-
placed by an exact technical viewing, 
such as by thermal-imaging devices. In 
addition to all this, the network pro-
vides the soldier with an augmented 
reality. From getting help with a for-
eign language, to the map showing the 
location of friend and foe, he is to be 
provided with every possible kind of 
supplementary information. He can 
veritably immerse himself in this aug-
mented reality, where information is 
shown to him via a see-through dis-
play, imaged directly into the optical 
field, for example in the form of dis-
tance lines, prohibited areas, or tar-
gets. (NSD 2001, composite vision: 20; 
Wehrtechnischer Report 2003: 31-35). 
Finally, the Land Warrior is to be given 
the capacity for autonomous and pro-
active action. The system should for 
example automatically recognise the 
soldiers’ positions and send out corre-
sponding reports. Bodily functions 
(pulse, temperature) are to be auto-
matically monitored and any irregu-
larities reported. Nano-technologies, 
which are planned for the successor of 
the Land Warrior – the Objective Force 
Warrior, – are to open up even more 
far-reaching possibilities: textiles 
which actively regulate the microcli-
mate, and which register any loss of 
blood and then automatically tighten, 
and which can recognise the sur-
roundings and adapt to them like a 
chameleon (Erwin 2003; Rötzer 2003; 
Shachtman 2004). 
Here, the technique of shaping the 
soldier consists in using this method 
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of fitting of new technologies directly 
onto the body of the infantryman, to 
constantly push the duality of techni-
cal and social into more areas of ac-
tion. The soldier becomes a hybrid 
actor, whose technical components are 
increasingly modified to take on quali-
ties which are considered to be specifi-
cally human – such as behaviour 
which is specific to a situation and the 
ability to learn during "proactive act-
ing" (cf. Rammert/Schulz-Schaeffer 
2002). For example the visual percep-
tion of the soldier’s surroundings, or 
his own bodily condition, changes 
from an exclusively social action to an 
action that is both human and me-
chanical; and the two can then be re-
combined in a modular way. In this 
manner the network-centric logic, of 
decoupling sensors, decision-makers 
and shooters, is transferred to the mi-
crolevel of the action of the individual 
soldier. Thus for example during the 
act of shooting, a kind of transference 
of media takes place in the unity of 
eye, firing sight, target-location and 
firing. Targets can be marked by hav-
ing data sent in from the network. In 
this way it is possible for soldiers to 
take aim at a target which they merely 
see in virtual form. This also makes 
new shooting techniques possible: by 
using a video-sight, the eye can be 
lifted from the sight, the rifle moved 
out from cover and held above the 
head or pointed round a corner. The 
image from the video-sight is trans-
ferred to the head-mounted display, 
and so the target can be aimed at in 
this way. Supported by the network, 
new forms of combat interaction also 
become possible. Thus a soldier can 
request laser or GPS guided fire, by 
marking an objective with his laser. 
The soldier becomes the sensor for a 
shooter who does not have the target 
in his field of view (cf. NSD 2001, Panel 
2: 4). The expected gain in flexibility, 
speed and coordination which this 
combination of man and machine of-
fers, is immediately apparent. 
The characteristic feature here is the 
projective, future-oriented nature of 
the scenario. The equipment appears 
to offer endless possibilities. And thus 
new projects are constantly invented. 
Even though the Land Warrior has not 
yet come into production, work is al-
ready being done on his successor.7 
With the technological shaping of the 
soldier a utopian telos of governance 
has already been brought into play: the 
human being as infinitely adaptable 
Cyborg. Such a vision is derived from 
the field of space travel in the early 
60’s and the associated literary genre. 
According to the predictions, the hu-
man being will be able to survive in 
surroundings hostile to life, thanks to 
scientific progress (Spreen 1998: 7-12). 
Essentially Land Warrior is working on 
a technical heightening of the sensing-
power of the soldiers. In the case of 
Future Force Warrior, the protective 
suit is itself to become "intelligent" as 
well, to recognise the surroundings, 
and assist the movement of the sol-
diers by "exoskeletal strength". What 
once applied to outer space, now gets 
transcribed to become a military pro-
gramme in battlespace: the "subject" 
                                                       
7 Equipped with a budget of 6 billion dol-
lars, the original plan was to have about 
10,000 such systems ready for deployment 
by the year 2000. However, today there is 
still no production-ready version 1.0 of the 
"Land Warrior". The planned introduction 
met with repeated delays because of tech-
nical problems. A report by the Govern-
ment Accountability Office (GAO 2005: 91-
92) states that in January 2005 the personal 
network area system, which contains the 
switches, wiring and interfaces which are 
meant to connect up the elements worn on 
the body, was still not ready. And also the 
software-based Joint Tactical Radio Sys-
tem, which was to ensure that all the radio 
equipment used in the tactical area would 
be compatible, was still at the development 
stage. A further problem was the enormous 
weight of the total kit, which depending on 
the kind of full set of equipment ranged 
from 86 to 100 pounds (Wehrtechnischer 
Report 2003: 31-38). 
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becomes the technological "project" 
(Flusser 1994). 
4.2 Professional Skills: the Idea of the 
Multi-Skilled Warrior 
In this new configuration, bottom-up 
processes and self-organisation be-
come the central factor in military op-
erations, especially at the tactical level; 
the Internet design of knowledge and 
information structuring, is thus trans-
ferred to the military organisational 
structure, inspired by media tech-
niques. This is perceived as the only 
way to be in a position to deal with the 
dynamics and complexity of the new 
military tasks. But more than just 
equipping each soldier with new tech-
nical skills – "digital skills" being the 
appropriate term here (Schaab/ Dres-
sel/Moses 2004; Baxter 2004) – they 
are to be given a broader set of overall 
capacities and competencies. 
In harmony with this idea, the Army 
Research Institute for the Behavioral 
and Social Sciences (ARI) is working 
systematically to determine precise 
profiles of the new requirements, and 
is carefully examining the models for 
new forms of training. As a first stage, 
a research programme of the ARI is 
investigating how the new set of geo-
strategic tasks and the push for more 
technology affects the conditions of 
the soldiers’ training and service. It 
has identified six basic changes (HRRO 
2005: 2-4). The organisation is to be 
understood as a "learning environ-
ment" and no longer as an organisa-
tion with stable descriptions of official 
posts. It exhibits a "transformed Army 
culture", because "every soldier is 
trained and equipped to be a decision-
maker". It is characterised by new 
communications methods, involving 
an enormous frequency of communi-
cations. These three points are now 
added at the top of the list of military 
criteria and requirements, and only 
afterwards do we find listed the old 
factors, such as action under stress 
and in situations of endangerment to 
life, as characteristic features of mili-
tary operations. Thus, the research 
institute suggests, right at the recruit-
ing stage other "KSA’s" (Knowledge, 
Skills, and Attributes) have to be tested 
and promoted: the ability to adapt, the 
ability to communicate, and even cul-
tural tolerance, these are given priority 
now. The training objectives here de-
fine a new type of soldier – this in turn 
attracts a different type of recruit, one 
who is far more educated, for the mili-
tary. "Intelligence" is prescribed as the 
main precondition. 
The essential purpose of the training, 
as proposed by the ARI, is found in the 
concept of the "Multi-Skilled Soldier", 
an aim which is clearly set apart as 
different from traditional training 
methods (Nelsen/Akman 2002). Tradi-
tionally there have been very clearly 
demarcated and separate descriptions 
of the individual occupations: this is 
termed Military Occupational Special-
ity (MOS). There is a very precise ruling 
about which skills a person fitting a 
particular MOS must have. The pur-
pose of this system, which was intro-
duced at the start of the 20th century 
in the sense of Taylorist job descrip-
tions, is to enable a ready access to 
replacements. Should, say, a soldier of 
a mortar platoon, with job code MOS 
11C20, be effectively put out of action, 
then he is simply replaced by another 
MOS 11C20. Naturally in this system it 
would still be possible for the soldier 
to gain further qualifications. But what 
has changed now is that in every train-
ing programme from the start, other 
wide-ranging skills from other de-
partments are to be integrated. Both 
teamwork and independence are to be 
strengthened. The job boundaries are 
now seen as flexible, the jobs them-
selves in the midst of a flux. As a con-
sequence of this, continued training is 
now the duty of every soldier. What is 
more, a quality which was previously 
considered suspect for all but the 
command levels, is now to be a stan-
dard requirement for every soldier: the 
creative problem-solving ability: "The 
focus of the training would be to instill 
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in the soldier the mindset of adaptabil-
ity, self-education, and problem solv-
ing as defining attributes." (ibid: 6) 
Adaptability, self-education, problem 
solving are viewed as necessary skills 
for every soldier at the crest of military 
missions in the information age: "In 
one moment in time, our service 
members will be feeding and clothing 
displaced refugees – providing hu-
manitarian assistance. In the next 
moment, they will be holding two war-
ring tribes apart – conducting peace-
keeping operations. Finally, they will 
be fighting a highly lethal mid-
intensity battle. All on the same day, all 
within three blocks. It will be what we 
call the three block war." (Gen. Charles 
Krulak, cited in Alberts/Hayes 2003: 66) 
Krulak’s oft-quoted idea of the "Three 
Block War" reflects the new situation 
in political security, the new percep-
tion of threat, here viewed from the 
perspective of tactical missions. The 
broadening of what one considers to 
be the military field of deployment 
becomes the basis for making new 
demands on the soldiers’ abilities and 
performance. It is the ready canvas, on 
which the image of the soldiers’ quali-
ties and skills is drawn. The situation 
may call for an instant transition from 
negotiating good relations between 
national groups, to fighting the enemy. 
It affects both the inner attitude, and 
also the skills needed in, say, switch-
ing a display from foreign language 
assistance to enemy situation picture. 
In such situations, the command and 
obedience structures ingrained by 
practice, the specialisations and me-
chanical routines – the kind of disci-
pline which Max Weber had in mind 
when he spoke of the "iron cage of 
obedience" – can no longer suffice to 
ensure an adequate service. The sol-
dier has to adapt himself to a regime 
of fluid transformation and change: 
"The multifunctional warrior is now 
trained to think not what to think. At 
one time, the warrior was trained only 
for certain missions. We are now 
breaking down this linear environ-
ment. Task organization is becoming 
increasingly fluid." (NSD, 2001, panel 
1: 7) 
This fluid, transformatory regime, 
which the sociological diagnosis iden-
tifies as the central characteristic of 
the information age (cf. Castells 1996, 
Lash 2002), is now dictating the mili-
tary plan of operations – it guides the 
profiling of the new soldier. While be-
fore the emphasis was laid on obedi-
ence, one now speaks of "empower-
ment". Network-centric warfare "in-
volves the empowerment of individuals 
at the edge of an organization" (Al-
berts/Hayes 2003: 5). And Land Warrior 
is considered to be one of the decisive 
instruments for flattening the hierar-
chy and shifting the power of the or-
ganisation downwards (Adams 2000: 
55). The spirit of a general is to be 
planted in every private. Thus Krulak 
(1999) could describe the new key fig-
ure emerging from this fluid regime, as 
the "strategic corporal". 
4.3 Professional Culture: the Ethos of 
the "Land Warrior" 
The protagonists of network-centric 
warfare orient themselves to the com-
munal visions of Internet culture, they 
relate network culture to a culture of 
the collectivity. As a result, the key 
problem which every social network 
organisation has to face now becomes 
crucial: if self-organisation tends to 
replace the hierarchy, then trust be-
comes the central resource for co-
operation (cf. Weyer 2000: 11-14). The 
Joint Vision 2020 speaks of a spirit of 
"jointness", which is to hold the armed 
forces together, from the small group 
up to the highest levels transcending 
the separate armed forces, from sol-
dier to leader. The theorists of net-
work-centric warfare go on to assert 
that "interoperability" also holds sway 
in a "cognitive" and "social domain" 
(Alberts/Hayes 2003: 107-114); that 
means it would be based on deep 
emotional and normative ties. Net-
work-centric warfare calls for a search 
for stronger forms of cohesion. And 
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here the answer to the problem of 
building trust can indeed be found in 
the traditional military way of 
strengthening self-definition: the com-
mon ethos of the soldier. Not only 
should the qualities and skills of the 
soldier be developed, it is the ethical 
shaping of the soldier which becomes 
a central project of a future-oriented 
transformation process. 
Considering effective ways to collect 
together all the "efforts on winning the 
Global War on Terrorism", the U.S. 
Army (2004: 15) named 16 concrete 
initiatives which were to be given pri-
ority. One of them was: "The soldier – 
develop flexible, adaptive and compe-
tent soldiers with a warrior ethos." 
Such a warrior ethos has been devel-
oped by a task force specially set up 
for this in the army’s programme of 
transformation. The result is tanta-
mount to a confession of faith: "A war-
rior’s ethos. I am an American soldier. 
I will always place the mission first. I 
will never accept defeat. I will never 
quit. I will never leave a fallen com-
rade. I am an American Soldier. I live 
by this creed."8 This ethos, which is 
firmly integrated at every step of train-
ing, is aimed not only at guiding the 
soldier’s behaviour, it is intended pri-
marily to promote a collective identity. 
To the question "What do you do for a 
living?", the soldier should no longer 
reply: radio-operator, cook or electri-
cal engineer in the army, or suchlike, 
but: "I’m a warrior" (Burlas 2004). Be-
sides this initiative, a plethora of dis-
cussions and programmes have arisen 
as to how this spirit of jointness is to 
be developed. Suggestions such as 
these emerge: to survey the "command 
climate", in order to assess the ability 
of officers to create trust (Jones 2003); 
to base the promotion system more 
firmly on the organisational unity 
rather than on individual careers 
(Smith/Corbin/Hellman 2001: 106-110); 
                                                       
8 This "Soldier’s Creed" in the concise ver-
sion cited here can also be found as a vid-
eoclip (www.army.mil/warriorethos/). 
to experiment with an extension and 
prolonging of the basic training in or-
der to strengthen the collective identity 
(Nelson/Akman 2002: 12). 
This leads conceptually to a twofold 
contradiction in the constitution of the 
"postmodern" military, as the military 
sociologists have observed, which is 
bound to emerge in network-centric 
warfare. The first point is the contra-
diction between the attributes of a 
"warrior" and a "peacemaker", which 
for example finds expression in the 
dichotomy of "to be fit for action" vs. 
"empathy", of "decisiveness" vs. "exper-
tise", of "obedience" vs. "co-
operativeness" (Nuciari 2003: 75). And 
secondly, the contradiction between 
an organisation which, oriented to 
social and yet no less to technological 
qualification profiles, compares and 
equates the professional image of the 
soldier to that of other commercial 
activities, and yet attempts to distin-
guish an ethos specific to the profes-
sion, the state of being a soldier, from 
all other activities (ibid: 76-80). Both 
are to be strengthened at the same 
time: the warrior and the peacemaker, 
the obedient soldier and the independ-
ently responsible expert. Network-
centric warfare makes of contradictory 
demands a feature of its programme. 
The new soldier is meant to be both 
peacemaker and warrior, he is to be 
capable of acting in an independently 
responsible, creative and adaptable 
way, while yet remaining ever obedient 
to orders, subject to the military col-
lectivity and duty-bound to service of 
the nation. 
When we look at the way these con-
tradictions come into play, we find that 
there is an aligning of the network-
centric military organisation to match 
the new opponents of the information 
age undermining the sovereignty of the 
modern state – from subversive politi-
cal networks, up to new forms of or-
ganized crime and terrorists groups. 
For these too – according to the analy-
sis of Arquilla/Ronfeldt (2001: 328-343) 
– replace organisational rigidity by a 
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greatly increased density of communi-
cations, which is achieved by a me-
thodical use of new information and 
communications technologies, and by 
encouraging a communal approach 
with the use of narrations, values and 
doctrines. The term network was al-
ways associated by the national force-
organisation with a kind of terror be-
cause networks are by nature organi-
sations at the boundary of formal ad-
hesion, at the edge of dissolution. It is 
not unusual for combatants to run off 
when they see things getting too risky. 
And networks are also seen as a terror 
because they operate constantly on the 
verge of transgressing rules. Indeed 
the network was ever the metaphor for 
the criminal, the underground, the 
radical. And it is precisely in this two-
fold manner of operating at the edge, 
that lies the radical nature and am-
bivalence of this endeavour to break 
through the bounds of the iron cage in 
which Weber saw the people of the 
modern era confined, by the mobilisa-
tion of the power of the Land Warrior 
(cf. Kaufmann 2005: 247-250). 
4.4 The Soldier on the Screen: the 
Network as Control Room 
Besides ethos and doctrine, network-
centric warfare does of course hold 
one special medium for securing trust: 
the military Internet itself, this "Com-
mon Operational Picture" (COP). In 
these techniques of subject-forming, 
characteristic forms of visibility are set 
up, one establishes effective control 
instances for maintaining and using 
visibility. And in this very control space 
we find a further utopian aspect of the 
network-form of governance, ex-
pressed here in military terms.9 
The essential element, around which 
the whole networked form of opera-
tion revolves, is the COP: "Shared bat-
                                                       
9 Regarding the social dispersion of net-
work-formed governance, see the outline 
by Kaufmann (2004). For the comparison to 
the supervisory technique of 360°-evalua-
tion, which functions in a very similar way 
to the COP, see Bröckling (2003). 
tlespace awareness emerges when all 
relevant elements of the warfighting 
ecosystem are provided with access to 
the COP. This means that battlespace 
awareness must be viewed as a collec-
tive property (a type of collective con-
sciousness)." (Alberts/Garstka/Stein 
1999: 135) The network-based military 
operates with a "collective conscious-
ness", in the form of media-
technology. The link-up to the COP 
widens the perception. The individual 
infantryman still knows the situation 
of friend and foe, he has sensor-data 
available to him, he is in e-mail-
contact with soldiers of neighbouring 
units and can call up assistance for his 
particular action over the network. But 
at the same time each individual sol-
dier is given a "data-double". The in-
fantryman will be constantly online, 
his movements will be registered and 
fed into the situation picture. He will 
have this picture presented to his own 
view on a head-up display, the whole 
time. Thus the soldier acts as his own 
observer, watching his actions as they 
are represented on the screen. The 
soldiers can become virtual command-
ers of themselves, because using the 
screen they are able to relate their own 
situation to the overall situation – and 
that means self-synchronisation. And 
they act always under the observation 
of the others for whom the same ap-
plies. The network becomes a general-
ised control space. The collective con-
sciousness, which Durkheim has so 
effectively shown to be widely distrib-
uted and deeply anchored in many of 
the regulations, norms and instances 
of society, would here be represented 
by a kind of running media installa-
tion. 
What the COP would mean here, is not 
so much a control by monitoring the 
execution of a plan, rather what hap-
pens is that the whole sequence of 
command and control – that means 
planning, reconnaissance, orientation, 
decision, command, surveillance – 
converges in one simultaneous proc-
ess. The optimum in governance is 
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attained if the constant self-adaptation 
to the changing situation pictures can 
be kept up. "Leadership" no longer 
figures as a quality which is allocated 
to one person or one position, but as 
an emergent phenomenon that devel-
ops out of the situation (Albert/Hayes 
2003: 184-186). 
This telos of governance, where there 
is a constant optimisation and fine 
adjustment of one’s own forces, does 
contain utopian factors for its opera-
tion.10 Gorman’s saying, "the network 
will enable you to see all that can be 
seen", relates to ideas of a "transparent 
battlefield", and many have imagined a 
"God’s-eye view" circulating in the 
network. And this is exactly where one 
finds the technological utopia: God’s 
insight is immediate, whereas soldiers 
have to rely on media, on data. Again, 
it is just at this point where the whole 
apparatus of information and commu-
nications technology, from the GIG to 
the display of the Land Warrior, comes 
into play, the whole process by which 
the reality is brought quite literally "in-
formation", via media, via the readings 
which are worked on by "digital skills". 
To imagine that this whole machinery 
steps into a kind of pure media-space, 
because it runs friction-free, is uto-
pian. This idea hides, for example, the 
dialectic that when one transfers the 
war almost entirely into another 
sphere, that of information, this leads 
to counter-movements.11 And it hides 
                                                       
10 It is precisely here where its strength lies: 
for example, although the implementation 
of Land Warrior has been delayed for years, 
the project is constantly being revised but 
never given up. And again the negative 
events experienced in the Iraq war – for 
example that strong forces of the Iraqi 
army were "overlooked" despite a superior 
surveillance, or that during the fast-moving 
mobile warfare in the first phase, it was not 
possible to set up information networks 
with corresponding swiftness – all this 
could be brushed aside while focussing on 
the future development to come. (cf. Scully 
2004; Onley 2004; Grant 2005). 
11 One knows for example that NATO, rely-
ing on their high-tech reconnaissance in 
the Kosovo war, dropped some 3,000 pre-
the "frictions" – to use this Clause-
witzian term – in one’s own gear-
wheels, which follow on from internal 
increases in complexity; for example 
when everyone is able to decide about 
targets.12 Viewed in this light, one 
might conclude that network-centric 
warfare is a project of the type de-
scribed by Daniel Defoe at the end of 
the 17th century: part of a phase of 
enthusiastic project-building, which 
takes it original model from the tower 
of Babel (cf. Klopotek 2004: 218-219). 
But of course this utopian undercur-
rent is linked to project-forms in the 
sense of contemporary management, 
which works with concrete objectives, 
with definite time-periods, with 
evaluations for individual intentions. 
The phase of enthusiastic project-
building is the driving force behind 
efforts to realise network-centric pro-
jects. The expectations for such tech-
nological and social developments are 
relatively impervious to problems, set-
backs, and the failure of individual 
projects, quite simply because they 
relate to nothing less than the thresh-
old of a new era. 
 
                                                                  
cision bombs. They struck 550 targets: 50 
tanks – and 500 decoys (Sloan 2002: 94-
95). Camouflage and simulation is only a 
means of counteraction, and indeed the 
internal military critics never tire in point-
ing out the sensitivity of information tech-
nologies towards counterattacks (among 
many others: Mey/Krüger 2005: 32-33, 36). 
12 The army officer Robert Leonhard (2000: 
156-157, 224-225) reports that during 
large-scale experiments with information-
based operations, the use of munitions 
caused "logistical nightmares". Instead of 
fighting important targets in a focussed 
way – and thereby sparing munition as 
planned, – everything that the improved 
surveillance identified as a potential target 
was immediately fired at. Hence there is a 
constant discussion about the problem of 
"information flooding" on all levels, and 
linked with this, whether one can raise the 
standard of training accordingly, specially 
at the lower level (cf. among many others 
Mey/Krüger 2005: 34). 
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5 Conclusion 
The military sociology, like the military 
programmatic theorists themselves, 
has for some time now been suggest-
ing that a comprehensive transforma-
tion of the military field is currently in 
progress. A discourse analysis of the 
programmatic itself, such as the one 
being carried out here, reveals that in 
its central formulations it is founded 
on expectations, which have hardly 
been acknowledged by the military 
sociological analysis: primarily, the 
expectation of a radical technical 
change. 
It was possible to take a three-tiered 
approach in describing this central role 
of the expectation of a technical 
change: there is the strategic-technical 
transformation which is inspired by 
the key-word "Information Age"; then 
the technical, organisational and op-
erative transformation by applying the 
idea of network-centric warfare, which 
is clearly realized as and decidedly 
presented as a coevolutive project; 
while at the level of soldierly discipline 
the transformation crystallises out as 
the Land Warrior project. 
In order to understand the mobilising 
force, the dynamics and range which 
the programmatic is developing on 
these three levels, we refer to two dis-
tinct research viewpoints with the 
theorems implicit in them. The idea of 
"prospective structures" gave some 
impression of the tremendous mobilis-
ing energy which the talk of a transi-
tion to the information age evokes in 
the military context. The term is linked 
to technocratic visions of monitoring 
and control, and suggests that in fu-
ture the superior weapons systems will 
result from the technology of com-
mand and control and no longer from 
superior weapons platforms. 
The idea of "prospective structures" 
draws on the actor-network theory, 
whose basic assumption is that techni-
cal change should always be expressed 
in sociotechnical terms, and against 
this background one can discover the 
logic linking together the key elements 
of the planned technical and social 
change of the military. The program-
matic of a network-centric warfare can 
be read as a kind of applied actor-
network theory, where a military 
Internet becomes the catalyst for a 
reconfiguration of the entire organisa-
tional fabric. And this leads to a new 
orientation for the organisational 
structure, the operational procedures, 
the information management and in-
formation culture. Here the network 
serves as the pivotal idea, guarantee-
ing the homologous alignment of the 
technical procedures and social roles, 
tasks and attitudes. The fact that the 
idea functions here more as a meta-
phor than a clearly defined concept, is 
precisely what lends it such power: it 
allows heterogeneous factors, those of 
decentralised, modular, flexible meth-
ods of co-ordination in the economic 
field, to be combined with tactical 
methods of battle and the communi-
tary approaches of an alternative 
Internet culture. Interconnectivity and 
interoperability become key features, 
applying in equal measure to technical 
systems, sociotechnical units of action, 
the units of organisation, and also to 
individuals. Furthermore the idea of 
network-centric warfare, in both its 
technical and its social components, is 
viewed as providing the answer to the 
various geostrategic and tactical chal-
lenges which the "Information Age" 
presents. 
This is most evident in the sociotech-
nical reconfiguration of the soldier, as 
envisaged by Land Warrior. By refer-
ring back to Foucault’s theory of sub-
jectivation, which is taken up in cur-
rent governmentality studies, we 
gained a viewpoint allowing a system-
atic approach to the change in the 
shaping of the soldier within this 
frame of a network-centric warfare. 
Firstly the soldier, and especially his 
senses, will be newly constituted as a 
sociotechnical hybrid. Secondly, it is 
not only the network of technical and 
human activities now being built onto 
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the body which imposes new demands 
on the capacities and skills of the sol-
dier. It is rather the overall functioning 
of a flexible and network-based or-
ganisation which makes up the ration-
ality of the concept of the "multiskilled 
warrior", who is primarily designed for 
adaptability, self-education and prob-
lem-solving. Thirdly, the question of 
how to compensate for the loss of 
formal cohesion which characterises a 
network is answered by a strengthen-
ing of fundamental ethics. And the 
method for this involves learning from 
the new network-organised challeng-
ers with an almost mirror-like emula-
tion. Fourthly, and this is the second 
answer to the loosening of formal co-
hesion, one feature of the Common 
Operational Picture is that a new form 
of control emerges, which no longer 
follows the old pattern of top-down 
control – the aim now is rather to se-
cure a constant adaptation to the 
situation by means of a generalised 
self-control. 
Thus we find that the reference to 
Foucault’s idea, that one should iden-
tify the traces of power in the constitu-
tion of the subject, gains a double sig-
nificance. It not only allowed a sys-
tematic analysis, at the level of sub-
ject-formation, of the perspective of-
fered by actor-network theory, trying 
to find the conditions, mechanisms 
and contents of networks where the 
technical action potential and social 
action potential become compatible. It 
also demonstrates in an exemplary 
way just how much the network co-
ordination form, with its independently 
acting, independently deciding, flexible 
subject, is the result of a power-based 
subjectivisation process. This is not a 
new discovery, but it does lend itself to 
a specially meaningful use in this mili-
tary context. 
As we have repeatedly stressed: here 
the main focus of interest has not been 
the theoretical or methodological as-
pects, but an examination of the basic 
sociotechnical orientation of the pro-
grammatic theorists, working to re-
configure the method of warfare, the 
military apparatus and above all the 
soldier, as a network-formation. It is 
well-known, for example from studies 
of organisation sociology, that there 
often lies a broad rift between such 
programmatic and the actual forms of 
operation and leadership. And not only 
where the internal structure is con-
cerned: the question also arises 
whether it is really feasible to deal with 
terrorist networks and a partisan-type 
warfare with forces armed in this 
manner. On this point we merely indi-
cated certain contradictory elements 
and the general utopian nature of the 
project. 
But one should take the programmatic 
seriously. It ought to give sociologists 
pause for thought, when the very insti-
tution which, at the beginning of the 
modern era, had for many social theo-
rists represented the model example of 
the new organisational and social type, 
and which is still now most strongly 
associated with a hierarchical struc-
ture, should now be found to be 
adopting quite a different organisa-
tional and disciplinary mode for its 
fundamental orientation. And not only 
this: until now it has hardly been con-
sidered in sociology how the entire 
field of national security is undergoing 
an extensive restructuring under the 
new head of "networking" (cf. Kauf-
mann 2006). In view of such consid-
erations, the diagnosis of the "Rise of 
the Network Society" can be granted 
further plausibility. 
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